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RIGHT OF A STATE TO APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES
JERRY KRONENBERG*
Whether or not a wise administration of the
criminal law permits giving to the State a right of
appeal is a familiar problem to those who have con-
cerned themselves with justice for the individual in
an ordered society.' The issue is framed in terms
of requiring an election of a lesser evil: should the
State be allowed to appeal, at the risk of possible
harassment of the accused; or should an acquitted
person be protected from further proceedings, at
the possible expense of requiring society to re-
absorb a criminal whose freedom was gained
through a lapse in the proper functioning of the
judicial machinery at the lower levels?
Today, in most states, the election is made in
large part by statute. But these statutes must be
interpreted insofar as they are ambiguous. More-
over, problems with respect to the state's right to
appeal may arise which cannot be settled by an
existing statute. Most statutes deal with explicit
problems; controversies outside of the specific
legislative expression must be decided by the
* The author is a senior law student at Northwestern
-University School Of Law and an Associate Editor of
this Journal's Student Editorial Board. His paper was
prepared under the supervision of the Board's Editor-
In-Chief, Mr. Jim Thompson and has been placed in
the NACPA's section of the Journal because of its
special interest to prosecuting attorneys.
IDean Roscoe Pound concerned himself with
the problem over fifty years ago, resolving it in
favor of state appeals. Pound, Inherent and Acquired
Difficulties in the Administration of Punitive Justice, 4
PRoc. Am. PoL. SCL Ass'N. 222, 237 (1907). Also see his
Dedicatory Address, 24 GEO. WASH. U. BULL. 15, 19
(1925).
courts independently of the statutes. To the extent
that the courts refuse to allow the state to appeal
in such cases, the reasons assigned are twofold: the
common law recognized no such right; and to grant
it would result in placing the accused in double
jeopardy.
The first section of this paper will examine the
validity of these two assertions since they may
control the disposition of cases not decided by ex-
press statutory authority; the second section wvill
deal with the statutes themselves; the last section
will be devoted to the policy considerations bearing
on the issue of appeals by the State in criminal
cases.
The Common Law
"At common law," according to one text writer,
"the state cannot appeal or sue out a writ of error
to review a judgment for the defendant in a crim-
inal case, even on demurrer, much less on a verdict
of acquittal .... ,, However, there is impressive
2This is a frequent suggestion of text writers, for
example, ORriELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA,
57-8 (1939); and 2 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITMONAL
LAw 822 (1910). In addition the cases have held that the
right to appeal in criminal cases is unknown at the
common law, that the right is a constitutional or statu-
tory one, that the right must be strictly limited to
express statements awarding it. State v. Bilton, 156
S.C. 324, 153 S.E. 269 (1930); State v. Lewis, 113 Ore.
359, 230 Pac. 543 (1925); State v. Peck, 83 Mont. 327,
329, 271 Pac. 707 (1928).
3 CLARK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 393 (1918). The
same conclusion was reached by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S.
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evidence of the existence of a common law right of
state appeal. The writings of distinguished English
commentators4 and a number of reported cases 5
indicate that the Crown did have access to writs
of error in criminal cases.
While this review was of a more or less formal
and direct sort, there existed as well informal, per-
haps indirect, but equally successful means for the
Crown to review prior decisions by virtue of which
an accused had been freed. In an "appeal by fel-
ony," 6 where the victim or his family proceeded
310 (1892), although the Court was somewhat less
positive than Clark: "The law of England on this
matter is not wholly free from doubt."
4 Lord Coke, commenting on the common law wrote:
"It appareth... that if a man be erroneously acquitted
of felony by verdict and judgment thereon given .. in
the case of erroneous judgment of acquittal that no
writ of error needeth to be brought by the King, but the
offender may be newly indicted." THIRD INSTITTEs OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. 214 (1860). Presumably in a
proper case, where the need did arise, a writ of error
could be brought. Similarly Chitty, in discussing the
English criminal law, wrote that a writ of error origi-
nally issued in any case only at the will of the King.
When he would exercise it in his own behalf, that was
review by the Crown, hence a kind of state appeal.
I CmrrY, A PRACTICAR TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL
LAW, 659 (1819). In addition, Bishop states that
"...writs of error seem allowable to the Crown in
criminal causes." I BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON
THE CRIMNAL LAW §1024 (9th ed. 1923).
The same point is made in ARCHBOLD, PLEADING,
EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 279
(23rd ed. 1905), and by Lord Hale who was explicit
that where an erroneous verdict of acquittal was given
it was nonetheless conclusive against the Crown "...
till the judgment be reversed by error," and that an
accused was free after acquittal ". . . till the judgment
of acquittal were reversed," and further that an accused
could not be re-indicted "... till the judgment be re-
versed by writ of error." II HiSTORIA PLACITORUM
CORONAE 248, 394-5 (1st American ed. 1778).
An early Maryland court, relying solely on the state-
ments of Lord Hale, granted the state the right to bring
a writ of error in a criminal case. State v. Buchanan,
5 Har. & J. 317 (1821).
5 Regina v. Houston, 2 Craw. & Dix 191 (1841);
Regina v. Chadwick, 11 Q.B. 205, 116 Eng. Rep. 452(Q.B. 1847); Regina v. Millis, 10 Cl. & Fin. 534, 8
Eng. Rep. 844 (Q.B. 1844). The last case was heard
before Lords Coleridge, Ellensborough, and Brougham,
none of whom seemed to have had any doubt about
the Crown's right to bring the writ.
While in these cases the propriety of the writs was
simply assumed and acted upon, in Regina v. Wilson,
6 Q.B. 620, 115 Eng. Rep. 233 (Q.B. 1844), the court
was more explicit if less direct. There the state sued
out a writ of certiorari to reverse an order quashing an
indictment. Although Lord Coleridge denied the
request on the grounds that here the writ was not ap-
propriate, he did say that ". . . if a writ of error be
brought we shall inquire whether what Sessions did was
erroneous or not."
61 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 244 (1883), gives a more detailed ac-
count of this proceeding.
with the Crown's permission against the accused
in a criminal proceeding, if the defendant were
acquitted he could nonetheless be indicted subse-
quently by the Crown to stand trial before another
jury for the same crime.'
While the practice of two prosecutions for the
same offense was not, strictly speaking, an appeal
in the modem sense, nevertheless it did give the
Crown a second chance at a defendant who, having
been acquitted of a crime by a jury, could there-
after be indicted to stand trial again, also before a
jury, for the same crime.
A somewhat similar device was the practice of
"attaint" which was a means available to the
Crown for reviewing decisions of a jury. When an
unfavorable verdict was returned, a second, larger
jury could be impaneled to review the correctness
of that verdict, with power to reverse it.9 As a'
result of the practice of "attaint," until it was
abolished in 1825, the Crown's right to have a prior
jury's determination reviewed was very much like
current notions of appeal. 0
The common law writ of "certiorari," available
to the Crown to review questions of law in some
CARTER, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH COURTS (5th ed.
1927). Thus in Young v. Sloughterford, 11 Mod. 217.
228, 88 Eng. Rep. 999, 1007 (Q.B. 1709), following
the accused's acquittal on an indictment of murder,
Chief Justice Holt ordered an appeal brought against
him for the same offense. On this appeal he was con-
victed by a jury and sentenced to death. In another
case, Smith v. Bowen, 11 Mod. 216, 230, 88 Eng. Rep.
998, 1008 (Q.B. 1709), the accused was convicted on an
indictment and was then pardoned. Nonetheless he
was later appealed for the same offense and convicted
(though he was again pardoned). Further illustrations
appear in I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 345 (1883).
8 I HOLDswoRTEH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 337
(7th ed. 1956).
9 When such a reversal occurred, the prior jurors
could be jailed, deprived of their chattels, and labeled
infamous. It is a matter for conjecture with what re-
luctance a jury would find against the Crown, particu-
larly in a reasonably close case. THAYER, EvIDENCE AT
THE COMMON LAW 156 (1898).
10 There is some dispute, however, as to the extent
attaint was available to the Crown in a criminal case.
Holdsworth and Thayer have expressed doubts as to
its availability. I HoISWORTH, supra, note 8 at 340;
THAYER, supra, note 9. On the other hand HALE. 2
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 310 was convinced that attaint
lay even in case of an acquittal. A middle ground
was taken in Sibley, Appeal on Matter of Fact in Crizi-
nal Cases, 32 LAw MAG. REV. 314, 319 (1907), who
conceded that attaint lay though it was not often used.
At least some support for that view is found in Farley,
Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Proce.,s.
42 YALE L. J. 194, 197 (1932), where it is reported that
jurors were fined for not bringing in satisfactory ver-
dicts, as by acquitting murderous felons.
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rather narrowly prescribed areas," and the right,
granted to the Crown about the middle of the
seventeenth century to have a new trial in all mis-
demeanor and some felony cases, 2 were further
common law rights which, like attaint and the
possibility of double prosecutions in early appeals
by felony, had roughly the same effect as twentieth
century appeal. 3
When these informal appellate practices are
viewed together with the common law cases and
the statements of distinguished common law com-
mentators relative to the granting of writs of error,
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
Crown (or the State) could review adverse decisions
at the common law. Thus American courts which
refuse to allow such review by the State on the
ground solely that such a right did not exist at
common law seem to base their refusal on an in-
substantial, or in any event, a highly arguable
ground.
The second legal basis which is invoked by the
courts, in the absence of an explicit statutory pro-
hibition, to justify refusing the state the right to
appeal in criminal cases, is that to do so would
n These are described in Goodnow, The Writ of
Certiorari, 6 POL. Sc. Q. 493, 497 (1896).
'! The relative ease with which new trials could be
had in misdemeanor cases is recorded in ARCHBOLD,
PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL
CASES 291 (23rd ed. 1905). It appears that a new
trial was granted in Regina v. Scaife, 17 Q.B. 238. 117
Eng. Rep. 1271 (1851), a felony case, but that does not
:eemn to have been a frequent result.
t3 This result no longer obtains in England because
of statutory modifications. The informal methods of
appeal were abolished in the early nineteenth century,
59 Geo. II, c. 46, (1819), and writs of error were
outlawed by the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, 7 Edw.
7. c. 23. As a consequence the Crown today has no
right of appeal except to the House of Lords in a very
few cases where the defendant has successfully appealed
a conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal and the
case is deemed by the Attorney General one of extra-
ordinary interest in the development of English crimi-
nal law. ARCIIBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE
AND PRACTICE (28th ed. 1931) reports at 313: "(The
Criminal Appeal Act) makes no provision for appeals
in case of acquittal or where judgment has been given
against the Crown on a demurrer or motion to quash
an indictment or to arrest judgment, and it makes no
provision for granting a new trial, even where the con-
viction on the first trial is quashed for technical
reasons." Also see ORFIELD. CRIMINAL APPEALS IN
AsEmIcA 57 (1939), where the author writes: "Even
at the present time the prosecution cannot appeal to
the Court of Criminal Appeals in England on any
uaatter, including not only acquittal, but orders of the
court."
Whatever the merits of this current English prac-
tice, it has been the result of slalutorv development.
and ,oes not negative the existence of prior common lav
rihts of appeal.
subject the defendant to doublejeopardy. It is true
that the great majority of the states have enacted
constitutional provisions prohibiting the placing of
an accused in jeopardy twice for the same offense;"'
but inasmuch as the concept of "jeopardy" has not
been defined in the various constitutions, the courts
have, for the most part, been free to define their
own limits in the application of this phrase. For a
definition of those limits the common law has not
been of much help; in fact the historical back-
ground of the concept of double jeopardy is rather
confusing.
At common law, the concept of jeopardy did not
constitute a legal bar to a retrial of a defendant for
an offense of which he had already been acquitted.
Jeopardy was said to attach upon an accused
person's plea of not guilty, 5 and if the action was
thereafter terminated, any subsequent re-indict-
ment for the same crime would constitute double
jeopardy. But the second proceeding on the original
charge would not be barred for that reason. Ac-
cordingly, many instances are found in the common
law reports where a jury was discharged after the
accused's pleading and after the swearing of the
jury as well, and this jury discharge did not bar a
future trial for the same offense-despite the clear
existence of the double jeopardy concept.'" How-
14 Only five states appear to have no constitutional
provision prohibiting double jeopardy. These are
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Caro-
lina, and Vermont.
I5 Counsel argued in an early case, Trin. 9 Hen. V. f.
7, pl. 21 (1421), that jeopardy had already attached by
the time the jury was sworn. The court did not dispute
this contention. In another, Hil. 16 Edw, IV, f. 11,
pl. 7 (1477), the defendant had pleaded not guilty and
was said to have been in jeopardy although the jury
had not yet appeared and been sworn. Justice Fairfax,
in a frequently quoted opinion, declared in response
to a request for a postponment: "That would be against
reason, for the defendant has pleaded a plea (not guilty)
by which he has put his life in jeopardy;.. ." Trin. 22
Edw. IV, f. 19, pl. 46 (1482).
'I Maitland informs us that in cases tried at the
Eyre of Kent the record shows ". .. that cases were
adjourned once or twice, or even oftener for further
evidence. Perhaps one might go so far as to say that
they were revived when some forgotten evidence was
recovered or remembered." MAITLAND, 24 SELD. SOC.,
EYRE OF KENT XLVI (1909). Again, when jurors
were sworn byindictment of felonv and when it was
found that the roll containing an entry of the indict-
ment was not ready in court, the jurors were allowed
to go at large and "they were later sworn anew as if
they had never appeared before." Hil. 7 Hen. IV, L
39, pl. 2 (1406). "So in several cases a man shall put
his life twice in jeopardy" said Justice Ascue in Hil. 21
Hen. VI, f. 28 pl. 12 (1443). BROOKE, ABRIDGEMENT tit.
APPEAL 41 (1576), cites examples of this fact and tit.
JUIRORs it states that in the event of a juror's illness or
death before verdict, a new trial could be held. This
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ever, an altogether different concept, autrefois
acquit, barred new proceedings after an acquittal.
The nature of this common law bar, as stated by
Blackstone, was:
"The plea of autrefois acquit, or a former
acquittal, is grounded on this universal maxim of
the common law of England, that no man is to
be brought into jeopardy of his life more than
once for the same offense, and hence it is allowed
as a consequence, that when a man is once fairly
found not guilty upon an indictment, or other
prosecution, before any court having competent
jurisdiction of the offense, he may plead such ac-
quittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for
the same crime."u7 (Emphasis added.)
It is apparent, therefore, that only a "fairly
found" jury verdict barred a new trial at common
law, 8 and that double jeopardy reflected only a
policy against trying a man more than once for the
same crime, and that policy found its legal expres-
sion in the separate and different concept of
autrefois acquit.
In the United States today there is nearly total
judicial agreement that double jeopardy itself con-
stitutes the legal bar to retrial for the same crime.
Moreover, the time at which jeopardy attaches in
a criminal case is neither when the defendant
pleads nor when the jury renders its acquittal (as
its common law antecedents of jeopardy or
autrefois acquit would seem to require), but rather
when the jury is impaneled, sworn, and charged
with the prisoner; that if the jury is discharged at
any time thereafter (except for certain specific and
compelling reasons such as the illness of the judge
or juror or in the case of a "hung jury") there has
been the equivalent of an acquittal and the de-
fendant must go free.1 9 Thus the American practice
appears to be the common law forerunner of the modem
practice of abandoning jeopardy after it has attached
in cases of necessity, thus allowing the state to retry
the defendant.
17 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335.
18 A number of cases direct themselves to the proposi-
tion that only a jury verdict precludes appeal (to the
extent that it is precluded at all): Windsor v. Queen,
[1866] 1 Q.B. 289, 303, 309; Regina v. Charlesworth,
1 B & S 460, 507, 121 Eng. Rep. 786, 804 (Q.B. 1861);
United States v. Bigelow, 3 Mack 393, 421 (D.C. 1884).
19 A brief historical introduction and explanation of
the American practice appears in the introductory note
to the Double Jeopardy volume of ALI, ADMINISTRA-
TION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1935). A summary and
survey of the practice in individual states can be found
in 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law §241 (1940), and 15 AM.
JUR., Criminal Law §369 (1938, Supp. 1958). See, for
example, Hunter v. Wade, 169 F.2d 973, aff'd 336 U.S.
684 (1948), and People v. Watson, 394 Ill. 177,
68 N.E.2d 265 (1946).
which is so lenient to defendants is not consonant
with the earlier common law procedures. It makes
no difference, so far as adherence to common law
is concerned, that American courts may mean
autrefois acquit when they speak of jeopardy, since
not even autrefois acquit could prevent Crown ap-
peals or second trials, as the previous discussion of
appeals by felony and attaint has demonstrated.
Moreover, from Blackstone's statement that one
must be "fairly found not guilty," it is at least
arguable that at the common law not even a jury
acquittal would preclude subsequent action when
the acquittal was the result of error in the trial
court.20
The purpose of this section is not to establish
conclusively that the right of appeal existed for the
prosecution at common law. The purpose is, in-
stead, to suggest that there is sufficient evidence of
the existence of that right that American courts,
absent specific constitutional or statutory pro-
visions, should not deny it to the State solely on
the ground that it did not exist at common law.
It is also suggested that double jeopardy consider-
ations did not bar retrials at common law and that
courts which now bar state appeals on double jeop-
ardy grounds do so on the basis of policy consider-
ations and not by reason of a legal construction of
the double jeopardy clause. (This policy factor will
be explored in detail in the last section of this
paper.)
The Statutes
The American Law Institute has proposed a
section in its Code of Criminal Procedure which
reads as follows:
"An appeal may be taken by the State (Com-
monwealth or People) from: (a) an order quash-
ing an indictment or information or any count
thereof. (b) an order granting a new trial (c) an
order arresting judgment. (d) a ruling on a ques-
tion of law adverse to the State where the de-
fendant was convicted and appeals from the
judgment. (e) the sentence, on the grounds that
it is illegal. '2
20 This is the position taken by the Connecticut
courts. State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 At. 1110 (1894)
and State v. Palko, 122 Conn. 529, 191 Atl. 320 (1937),
aff'd 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
21 The Texas constitution prohibits state appeals.
Thx. CONST. art. 5, §26.
2 ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §428 (1930).
However, the ALI ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW §13 (1935), would, in addition, allow the state
the right to a new trial when there was a material error
prejudicial to the state, despite a nrior acquittal.
[Vol. 49
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Many states have enacted quite similar statutes,
although no state has adopted the precise form of
the proposed statute.n In general, the great ma-
jority of states allow, with only insignificant devi-
ations from the model code, appeals from orders of
the court but not from a judgment of acquittal,
although the latter limitation is imposed more by
the cases interpreting the statutes than by any ex-
plicit statements in the statutes themselves. In two
of these states, Colorado and North Carolina, an
appeal may be taken by the Attorney General not
merely from orders but from a declaration that the
statute is unconstitutional. In Michigan the state
may appeal from an order to quash or to arrest
judgment only when these orders are based on the
unconstitutionality of a statute.25 The Alabama
statute provides that the state may appeal when
the act of the legislature under which the indict-
ment or information is brought is held to be un-
constitutional. The state's case law has made this
the only occasion for appeal. 2
In some states it has been provided that the at-
torney general may, with the court's permission,
bring an appeal to the supreme court to deter-
2 In Washington, for example, the state may appeal
orders to quash, in arrest of judgment, or for a new
trial, but in addition has the right to appeal from
".... any order which abates the action otherwise
than by an acquittal of the defendant by the jury."
WAsH. REV. CODE §10-73.020 (Supp. 1954). Under this
provision a directed verdict can be appealed from,
State v. Bruhn, 22 Wash.2d 120, 154 P.2d 826 (1945),
although this is not allowed in the model statute.
Similarly, Florida has adopted a statute exactly like
the model statute except that in addition it allows an
appeal from a judgment discharging the defendant on
habeas corpus. F.A. STAT. §924.02 (1941).
"4AIuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§13-1711-12 (1956);
CAL. PEN. CODE §1466; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§39-
7-24, 27 (1953); FLA. STAT. §924.02 (1941); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §19-2801 (1948); IND. ANN. STAT. §9-2304
(1956). Section 9-2305 gives the state the right to appeal
any question not one of fact in misdemeanor cases;
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §62-1703 (1949); LA. REV.
STAT. tit. 15, §540 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, §14
(1957); Miss. CODe ANN. §1153 (1942); Mo. REV.
STAT. §§547.200, 210, 230 (1953); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. §94-8104 (1947); NEV. REv. STAT. §177.060(1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-15-3, 6 (1953); N.Y.
CODE CUMs. PROC. §518; N.C. GEN. STAT. §15-179
(1953); N.D. REv. CODE §29-2807 (1943); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 22, §1053 (1951); ORE. REv. STAT. §§138.020,
60 (1953); S.D. CODE §34-4101 (1939); WAsH. REV.
CODE §10-73.020 (Supp. 1954). Tennessee's statute is
much simpler; it provides that the state may appeal
to the Supreme Court just as it may in civil cases
except where the defendant has been acquitted in the
trial court; TENN. CODE ANN. §40-3401 (1956), and
State v. Malouf, 199 Tenn. 496, 287 S.W.2d 79 (1956).25 Micn. STAT. ANN. §28.1109 (1954).
26 A.A. CODE tit. 15, §370 (1940); State v. Gray,
256 Ala. 31, 55 So.2d 354, 8 (1951).
mine a 'disputed point of law, although this de-
termination would not affect any defendant who
may already have been acquitted. In at least
eight states,2' this right accompanies the right to
appeal from preliminary orders, or as in North
Carolina, from the labelling of a statute as un-
constitutional. In five statess this form of moot
appeal not affecting the defendant is the only
appeal which the statutes permit.
In at least three states there is no right of appeal
by the State at all. Texas is most explicit: it has
enacted a constitutional provision which declares
that "the state shall have no right of appeal in
criminal cases."' ' In Georgia30 and MinnesotaO the
right is denied by omitting mention of the state in
the statutory provisions authorizing whatever ap-
peal is allowed in criminal cases. Not far removed
from such statutes is that of Illinois where the
state's sole right to appeal extends only to orders to
quash or set aside the indictment.E
The law of Virginia and West Virginia is unique,
due to the rather unusual constitutional provisions
in these two states. Virginia's constitutionn gives
the state the right to appeal only in those criminal
cases involving the violation of a law relating to
the state revenue, while in West Virginia3 the
state can appeal in cases relating to the publit
revenue and "such other... as may be prescribed
by law."35 The courts of West Virginia have taken
this to mean that an appeal is proper from pre-
liminary orders but not from an acquittal, so as not
to place the defendant in jeopardy twice.36
The double jeopardy rationale of the West
2 Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana,
North Carolina, North Dakota, and Oklahoma; prob-
ably also in Michigan, Kentucky. Ky. CRm. CODE
§§335, 169, 177, 178 (Baldwin 1948).
2 Anx. STAT. §§43-2720, 22 (1947); OHIO REv.
CODE §§2945.67-70 (1953). The statutes have been
construed to allow an appeal only to fix the law for
the future, not to get a reversal. State v. Lynch, 81
Ohio 336, 340 90 N.E. 935 (1910); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§29-2314, 16 (1943); Wyo. Corn'. STAT. ANN. §10-1308,
11 (1945).
29 TEx. CONsT. art. 5, §26. It is interesting to note
that this section is found in the article devoted to thejudiciary and does not seem to be associated with the
prohibition against double jeopardy which is found in
art. 1, §14. Moreover, the introductory commentary
to the section lists the reasons usually cited in defense
of a denial to the state of the right to appeal, and
double jeopardy is not one of them.10 GA. CODE §6-901 (1935).31 MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§632.01, 05 (1949).
,2ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, §747 (1955).
m VA. CoNsT. art. 6, §88.
3'W. VA. CONsT. art. 8, §3.
35 W. VA. CODE ANN. §5182 (1955).36 Ex parte Bornee, 76 W.Va. 360, 85 S.E. 529 (1915).
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Virginia court points up the principal legal basis
given for statutes which limit the state's right of
appeal to preliminary orders of the court. In the
great majority of states jeopardy attaches at the
swearing and impaneling of the jury;"' thereafter
no appeal or new trial is allowed unless the defend-
ant waives the jeopardy, as by moving to arrest
judgment, or because of dire necessity, as when the
judge dies. Consequently, when the jury renders a
verdict for acquittal, clearly, under this rationale,
no appeal or new trial can be available. This ac-
counts for the decision of the courts of West Vir-
ginia to limit state appeal to preliminary orders.
But this seems merely a policy decision; surely the
courts could have allowed an appeal even from an
acquittal on the basis of the broad authorization
in the West Virginia constitution. The constitution
of Virginia does not mold its state appeals practice
to conform to the jeopardy theory, since in revenue
cases the state can appeal even where the liberty of
the defendant is involved, irrespective apparently
of jeopardy, and in non-revenue cases the state can-
not appeal even when there has been no jeopardy.
While the West Virginia courts, having broad
constitutional authorization, construed it to pre-
clude appeal of an acquittal, Wisconsin, on the
other hand, with an express constitutional prohi-
bition against placing an accused twice in jeopardy,3
nonetheless allows the state to appeal even from
an acquittal. A Wisconsin statute specifically per-
mits the appeal. 40 Wisconsin has been able to do
this since it holds jeopardy to attach only after a
final judgment is rendered and the accused is dis-
charged. Thus if an appeal is requested immediately
upon the verdict of acquittal, jeopardy has not
attached and cannot bar subsequent proceedings. 4
As a result, in Wisconsin the state has in effect an
unlimited right to appeal, provided it is promptly
applied for by the prosecution.
Connecticut follows a similar practice. There
appeals "may be taken by the state, with the per-
mission of the presiding judge, to the Supreme
Court of Errors, in the same manner and to the
same effect as if made by the accused." ' Despite
the fact that the Connecticut constitution contains
no prohibition against double jeopardy, the courts
have felt compelled to reconcile the result reached
3 See note 19, supra.
3 Commissioner v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, 07 S.E. 820
(1919).
9 WIs. CONST. art. 1, §8.
40 WIs. STAT. §958.12 (1955).
41 State v. King, 262 Wis. 193, 54 N.W.2d 181 (1952).
4 CONN. GEN. STAT. §8812 (1949).
under the statute with the jeopardy concept. Ac-
cordingly, it is said that a single jeopardy is ex-
hausted only when there has been a final judgment
free from error. The basis for the Connecticut view
is well stated in Stale v. Lee.4 "The principle which
protects an individual from the jeopardy involved
in a second trial for the same offense is well estab-
lished, and fully recognized. The question, how-
ever, as to what constitutes a trial, depends upon
the course of procedure of the particular jurisdic-
tion in which it is had, and the construction of the
courts there with respect to it."
Connecticut thus suggests one means available
for allowing a departure from traditional proce-
dure. Pennsylvania suggests another. Its statute
says only that the state may except to any decision
or ruling in cases charging the offense of nuisance
or forcible entry and detainer, or forcible detainer.**
Through court interpretation, this statute has not
prevented the state from appealing from an ac-
quittal in cases not explicitly mentioned in the
statute.45 The state may also appeal from orders
presenting questions of law generally,4 6 and in
cases where there is a question raised about the
constitutionality of an act upon which the indict-
ment is based.a By treating the statute as non-in-
clusive of all state remedies, the Pennsylvania
courts have been able to expand the concept of
state appeal.
This survey of the statutes bearing on the state's
right to appeal indicates the wide variety of posi-
tions which are taken. It would seem that the sig-
nificant factors in the statutory scheme are, first,
that there is a considerable diversity of practice
among the states; and second, that the relevant
constitutional and statutory provisions allow some
degree of latitude for the courts to explain, to in-
terpret, and thus to make the law. In only nine
states do the statutes themselves specify that the
listed opportunities for state appeal are exhaustive.41
4365 Conn. 265, 30 At. 1110 (1894).
4 PA. STAT. (Purdom) §1188 (1930).
1- Milk Control Comm. v. Hollinger, 170 Pa. Super.
180, 84 A.2d 794 (1952). -
40 Commonwealth v. Dolon, 155 Pa. Super. 453, 38
A.2d 497 (1944).
1 Commonwealth v. Frank, 159 Pa. Super. 271,
48 A.2d 10 (1946).
40This express statement seems to be present in
only the statutes of Arizona, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
and Oregon. It is not so much the statutes as it is the
cases which make the stated remedies exclusive; for
example: State v. Huebner, 233 Ind. 566, 122 N.E.
2d 88 (1954), People v. Ballots, 252 Mich. 282, 233
N.W. 229 (1930), State v. Peck, 83 Mont. 327, 271
Pac. 707 (1928).
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Therefore, since most courts are free to define when
jeopardy attaches, they can, if they wish, adopt
the Connecticut-Wisconsin view.4 9 Therefore, if a
court is inclined to adopt the Connecticut-Wiscon-
sin position it should not be deterred by reason of
any double jeopardy concern.
To the extent that the courts have this freedom
and the jeopardy problem is thus eliminated, resort
to the common law will not suffice as an excuse to
deny the state the right to appeal."
The Policy Factors
To the extent that the state is allowed no appeal,
the refusal is an historical reaction from a procedure
which gave to the Crown inordinate advantages in
the prosecution of an accused. 51 Because of this
factor, modern society has developed a practice
which inhibits the state to such an extent that
today the accused has the decided advantages in
criminal prosecution, e.g., in the presumption of
innocence, the doctrine of privileged communica-
tions, the guarantee against self-incrimination and
the right of practically unlimited appeal. Although
it might have been wise to limit the state's rights
to an appeal in the days when the accused did not
have the many rights he now has, it is highly ques-
tionable whether the "no appeal" policy of today
is a wise one in view of the many other protections
accorded accused persons9 2
Those who oppose state appeal cite two principal
policy arguments in their support: the hardships
4 This statement must be qualified to the extent
that eight states have constitutional provisions pro-
viding that no person shall, after acquittal, be tried
for the same offense: Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma and Rhode
Island.
50 See the first section of this article for the detailed
reasons in support of this conclusion.
51 ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN A5IERICA 56-7
(1939).
5' "Under the criminal procedure the accused has
every advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly
to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline
of his defense. He is immune from question or comment
on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the
least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole
audience against him to pick over at his leisure, and
make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been
able to see. No doubt grand juries err and indictments
are calamities to honest men, but we must work with
human beings and we can correct such errors only at
too large a price. Our dangers do not lie in too little
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been
always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man con-
victed. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is
the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that
obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime."
United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (1923).
caused defendants who have been acquitted, and
the benefits of a jury trial.0 They argue that de-
fendants in criminal cases are rarely wealthy and
that once they have borne the costs of the initial
trial it is undue harassment to require the added
expenditure on appeal for counsel, transcripts, and
the other necesssary costs. Particularly is this true
when the state may thereafter appeal from the
intermediate to the ultimate appellate tribunal.
Moreover, the hardships are not only of a financial
nature, but there is also the factor of time con-
sumed on appeal, of the probability of frivolous
appeals by the prosecutor, and the further damage
to the accused's reputation. An additional argu-
ment is the proposition that a jury verdict repre-
sents a societal judgment, an opportunity for pub-
lic opinion to make itself felt in the administration
of criminal law. State appeal, presumably, would
eliminate these advantages.
While it is true that some hardship will fall to
the accused on an appeal by the state, there are
compensating values which make the right of a
state appeal desirable. Means can be found to
minimize the hardships. The expenses on appeal
can be borne by the state. Expenses involved in
providing such items as the transcripts need present
no problems. Counsel can be selected by the ac-
cused or provided by the court from a group recom-
mended or at least approved by the various bar
associations, with payment of more or less standard
fees by the court. The concrete form of the plan is
less a problem than the decision to adopt some such
procedure. Some states have already done so.Y The
effect of its adoption would be not merely to relieve
the accused of financial burdens on appeal but it
would also discourage the prosecution of frivolous
appeals since the state would have to pay for them
and justify the expense to the public each election
year. In addition, preference can be given to state
appeals on the courts' calendars so that an early,
final determination would result without impair-
ing even the spirit of the guarantee of a speedy
trial. While it is true that an acquitted defendant's
reputation may not be enhanced by forcing him to
defend an appeal, at the same time it is not likely
to be injured either. The fact of appeal is ordinarily
not publicized as is the trial and the jury verdict. If
the appellate court sustains the lower court judg-
51 For a typical exposition of these views see ORFIELD,
supra, note 51 at 62, 71.
54In Nebraska, for example, the court appoints
counsel to anyone opposing the state and pas a fee
not to exceed $100.00.
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ment (and this will be quickly ascertained if state
criminal appeals are given preference in appellate
courts) the acquittal itself becomes completely free
of the taint which often accompanies a jury verdict.
Moreover, if the state is allowed an appeal as of
right, it seems likely that to the public mind it will
be treated only as a matter of course when it is
exercised. In many states, whatever right of appeal
the state has is to the state supreme court, fore-
going the intermediate appellate tribunals.5 5 This
seems altogether fair; the accused should not have
to defend more than a single quickly expedited
appeal and the state should not have to pay for
more.
With regard to the effect of a jury trial, it is a
debatable question whether society's best interests
are always served by this institution.Y Assuming,
however, that they are, the right of state appeal
would not lessen its salutary effects. Appeal would
be on questions of law alone. Fact finding is the
jury's prerogative; although a reviewing court
might disagree with the jury's verdict it could
rarely say that the jury erred in not being con-
vinced "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus the
ultimate question of fact remains for the jury to
determine. Appeal assures that the jury will have
considered only proper evidence and instructions,
and that counsel's conduct was also legally proper.
The jury would remain free to apply "community
standards" and to render "moral judgments,"
for they could still disregard the evidence and the
court's instructions.
The greatest advantage to accrue from accord-
ing the state the right to appeal would be the pro-
tection thereby afforded society from the criminals
who now avoid convictions because of improper
conduct of defense counsel, the erroneous exclu-
sion of admissible evidence, the erroneous refusal
of the trial court to give certain state requested in-
structions and the giving of erroneous instructions
favorable to the defense. Today such matters are
not subject to review, regardless of how outrageous
the errors may be.M
55 This provision is incorporated in most statutes
authorizing appeal. TENN. CODE ANNu. §40-3401 (1956)
begins: "Either party to a criminal proceeding may
... pray an appeal in the nature of a writ of error to
the Supreme Court .... MscH. STAT. ANN. §28.1109
(1954), uses the words "...direct to the Supreme
Court."5
' A. F. Triplett, Trial By Jury-A Farce, 7 ARK.
L. REV. 215 (1953); McWhorter, Abolish the Jury,
57 Ams. L. REv. 42 (1923); Sebille, Trial By Jury:
An Ineffeclive Surival, 10 Am. B. J. 53 (1924).
" See the discussion of the statutes in Part I.
The experience in jurisdictions permitting state
appeals clearly indicates that there need be no
fear of abuses of this right; the right has rarely
been exercisedM This is probably due largely to
the fact that when the court and both parties know
that an appeal may be taken by either side they
are all likely to be more zealous in an attempt to
avoid error. Thus, paradoxically, the right to ap-
peal may obviate the need to appeal. Moreover, the
relatively few instances of state appeal also estab-
lish as unwarranted the fear that prosecutors will
take numerous or frivolous appeals if granted the
opportunity. To the extent, however, that this fear
persists, appeal by the state could be restricted to
such cases where the trial judge or the appellate
court or a justice thereof has probable cause to
think the appeal might be successful or might con-
structively contribute to an efficient legal system,
and only with such consent may it proceed.n
A second advantage in state appeals is the effect
it would have on trial judges. It would curb to a
considerable extent the corrupt or politically moti-
vated conduct on the part of some judges who can
now act with impunity. Other judges, too, would
be more careful in their rulings and conduct, for
which they can only be corrected now when they
make errors prejudicial to the accused. Permissive
state appeals would effect a very desirable improve-
ment with respect to both these factors. 60
The third great advantage which accrues to
society when the state can appeal is that the result-
ing decisions will develop the criminal law both as
to its procedural aspects, as in appeals from orders,
and as to substance, when an appeal of an acquittal
allows an examination of the trial court's rulings
and instructions. Thus an initial error would not
perpetuate itself as it can today, when, in most
states, even the most patent errors cannot be cor-
s Such statistics are collected in PERKINS, IOWA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 68 (1932); SHERILL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN NORTH CAROLINA 23 (1930); and
Beattie, Criminal Appeals in California, 24 CALIF.
L. REv. 623, 25, 29 (1936). Statistics collected in
Miller, Appeals by Ihe Slate in Criminal Cases, 36
YALE L. J. 486 (1927) indicate that in Connecticut
within a sixteen year period (volumes 82 to 98) the
state appealed in only seven cases. There were as
many reversals, percentage-wise, when the state ap-
pealed as there were when the defendant appealed.59 The statutes of Connecticut and Missouri, for
example, have such a requirement.
6
01n PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
LAw 236 (1953), the author suggests that to the extent
that more attention is focused on judges through an
opportunity to appeal all their decisions, and they are
therefore required to be more responsible, to that
extent the judgeships will attract better men.
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rected through appeal after an acquittal. State
appeal would alsb promote uniformity within the
state, as where in separate districts separate trial
courts may have ruled differently on the same issue.
Unless the defendant initiates an appeal in one of
these districts, the state's law will not be uniform.
And when a trial court directs the acquittal of a
defendant because of a mistaken doubt as to the
constitutionality of the statute, as, for example,
in defining his offense, and at the same time the
state is allowed no appeal, then in effect the trial
courts can, at least on occasion, become the final
authority of the act's validity. Since the defendant
cannot be expected to appeal the cases which he
wins and since these are precisely the cases with
which the state is chiefly concerned, especially
when it feels they are the results of errors, the ap-
peals of the defendant alone cannot, as some au-
thorities argue, be expected to develop, unify, or
clarify the law.6' Particularly is this true when for
financial reasons, most defendants do not appeal
when they lose in the trial court, no matter how
persuasive their cases would be on appeal.n
6! ORFIELD, supra, note 51 at 73.
61 Many states recognize the need for a clear deter-
mination of what the law is and hence have provided,
where the state can appeal not at all or only from
preliminary orders, for the attorney general to take
questions of law to the Supreme Court of the state
although the result can have no effect upon the de-
fendant once he has been acquitted. See part II of this
article. The federal government allows no such moot
appeal. United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297, 300(1909). It is submitted that this means of development
of the law is not desirable. Historically and tradi-
tionally, decision of moot questions has not been con-
sidered a proper function for the courts, and the right
to this sort of appeal has little practical value. See
Cooper, Is the Deciding of Moot Questions a Judicial
Function?, 7 ORE. L. REV. 228 (1928). The constitu-
tional problems which such suits present are discussed
in the Evans case, and in Munson, The Decision of Moot
Cases by Courts of Law, 9 COLUm. L. REv. 667 (1909).
The prosecutor is always busy with more cases than
he has time to try. He isn't likely to spend his limited
time prosecuting an appeal when a reversal won't do
him any practical good; the defendant still goes free
and the likelihood of ever getting another case during
his term in office which raises the same legal problems
in the same way is not statistically good. Nor will the
publicity attendant on a successful appeal equal that
of a successful prosecution of a new case at the trial
level. At the same time an appeal advertises, to the
extent it becomes known, the prosecutor's failure in the
court below. Moreover, there is also something de-
moralizing, when the appeal succeeds, in the knowledge
that there is at large in society an acquitted defendant
who is guilty of a crime and that society is powerless
to retry him.
But eliminating all of these considerations, the
problem as to who defends the appeal remains. An
acquitted defendant has no interest in the further
proceedings. If the court appoints counsel to argue the
The two legal objections made to state appeals
have already been touched upon in the first section
of this article. It was suggested that a state appeal
may have existed at common law and that concepts
of double jeopardy were no bar. It was also sug-
gested that American courts today have con-
structed a double jeopardy bar to state appeals on
policy grounds in order to prevent such appeals.
It is submitted that such policy constructions of
the double jeopardy clause are unsupportable and
that courts which want to come to the conclusion
that state appeals are a good thing may do so in
spite of the double jeopardy arguments which are
usually raised against such a result.
Kepner v. United States63 is usually cited by those
who insist that state appeal would subject an ac-
quitted defendant to double jeopardy. It is true
that a majority of the United States Supreme
Court came to this conclusion, but only in the
face of a powerful dissent by Justice Holmes, who
said:
.... it seems to me that logically and ration-
ally a man cannot be said to be more than once
in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he
may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing
jeopardy from its beginning to the end of the
cause. Everybody agrees that the principle in
its origin was a rule forbidding a trial in a new
and independent case where a man already had
been tried once. But there is no rule that a man
may not be tried twice in the same case.""
(Emphasis added.)
The Connecticut courts have reached the same
conclusion. In State v. Lee,' the classic case allow-
ing a state appeal despite double jeopardy objec-
tions, the court resolved the supposed conflict be-
tween the concept of double jeopardy and the
right of the state to a fair trial, free from error, in
this manner:
"The function of courts is to settle contro-
versies according to law. The object of settle-
ment is secured by the principle of finality of
judgments. The object of settlement in accord-
ance with law the same in all cases, is secured
case it is highly unlikely that he will offer the best
defense available without the incentive of having a
client whose life or freedom depends upon his knowl-
edge, perseverance and skill. In either case, irrespective
of who defends this moot appeal, the court is not likely
to hear more than the state's appeal in its fullest, most
persuasive form.195 U.S. 100 (1904).
14 195 U.S. at 134.65 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110 (1894).
